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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature ofthe Case
This case involves the interpretation of Idaho's mechanic lien statutes pertaining to
professional services. More particularly, the case involves the question of whether the lien priority
for professional services is based upon the commencement of any professional services or if priority
is limited to services furnished on-site.

Statement o(Facts
On June 18, 2007, Stanley Consultants, Inc. ("Stanley"), an engineering company, entered
into a contract with L222-2 ID Summerwind, LLC. ("Summerwind"), a developer, to provide
professional engineering services toward the improvement of certain real property known as the
Summerwind at Orchard Hills Subdivision. (R. Vol. V, p. 672,

~~3

&5, p. 676). The professional

service contract provided for Stanley to perform certain engineering services, including a
topographical map sufficient to design a golf club building, a parking lot, and drainage facilities as
well as designing and preparing a grading and drainage plan for the club house and parking facilities
and a potable water line and gravity flow sewer connection. ( R. Vol. V. P. 678). These engineering
services included project administration services descried as "initiat[ing] the project including setting
up project files, preparing budgets and schedules." !d.
In accordance with the contract, Stanley commenced its professional services on June 26,
2007, by furnishing labor, materials, and engineering services to improve the Property. (R. Vol. V,
p. 678). On July 19, 2007, Stanley began work involving on-site physical improvements to the
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Property. ( R. Vol. IX, p.519). On July 13,2007, Integrated Financial Associates, Inc., recorded a
Deed of Trust. ( R. Vol. IV. p. 641)
Stanley last performed professional engineering services on the Property on or about January
9, 2008. ( R. Vol. IV. p. 641). Summerwind failed to fully compensate Stanley for its professional
engineering services. As a result, in accordance with Idaho Code §45-50 1, Stanley recorded a Notice
and Claim ofLien on February 22, 2008 in Canyon County Recorder's Office as Instrument Number
2008009213. (R. Vol. IV. p. 653).

Course o(Proceedings
The Course of Proceedings are set forth in the Appellant's Opening Brief. For convenience
sake, however, the key event on appeal is the District Court's entry of Judgment on August 8, 2013,
which asserted that Stanley's priority date was the date it first provided actual physical work on-site.
The Judgement stated, in relevant part:
That the priority date of Defendant Stanley Consultants, Inc.'s lien at issue in this
lawsuit, filed on February 22, 2008, ... , for the purposes of applying Idaho code
Section 45-506, is July 19, 2007, is the date actual physical work was actually
conducted within the boundaries of the legal description of the property at issue in
this lawsuit, and not the earlier day that Stanley commenced to furnish professional
services under its contract for the project at issue.
(Supp. R. P. 70)

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the District Court Commit Error in Interpreting Idaho Code Section 45-506 as
Establishing Lien Priority Based upon the Date the Professional Services Were Provided On-site
Rather than the First Date the Professional Provided Any Services?
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Given that there were no factual disputes at issue, the typical standard of review for summary
judgment matters is not applicable in the case at bar.

Instead, this case involves statutory

construction to which this Court exercises free review. Intermountain Real Props., L. L. C. v. Draw,

L.L.C., 155 Idaho 313,317-18,311 P.3d 734,738-39 (2013); Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928,
318 P.3d 918,924 (2014).

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred When it Determined That Idaho Code 45-506's Lien Priority
Date for Professional Services Was Based upon the Date the First On-Site Services
Were Rendered Rather than the Date in Which Any Professional Services Were
Commenced to Be Furnished.
The District Court committed reversible error when it improperly concluded that Stanley's

lien priority date was the date in which it provided on-site services rather than the date in which it
first provided any professional services. As set forth below, the District Court's conclusion was not
supported by the plain meaning of the statute and nullified the Legislature's intent to provide
Professional Engineers with the most lien protection.

A.

Idaho's Mechanic's Lien Statutes.

The statutes at issue on appeal are Idaho Code §45-50 1 and §45-506. The former creates the
lien right while the latter sets forth the lien preferences or the priority dates for when various liens
attach.
Idaho first introduced the mechanic's lien in 1893 which provided that:
Every person performing labor upon or furnishing materials to be used in the
construction, alteration or repair of any mining claim, building, wharf, bridge, ditch,
dike, flume, tunnel, fence, machinery, railroad, wagon road, aqueduct to create
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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hydraulic power or any other structure, or who performs labor in any mine or mining
claim, has a lien upon the same for the work or labor done or materials furnished,
whether done or furnished at the instance of the owner of the building or other
improvement or his agent; and every contractor, sub-contractor, architect, builder or
any person having charge of any mining or of the construction, alteration or repair
either in whole or in part, of any building or other improvement, as aforesaid shall
be held to be the agent ofthe owner for the purpose of this chapter: Provided, that the
lessee or lessees of many mining claim shall be considered as the agent or agents of
the owner under the provisions of this chapter.
1893 Sess. Laws, ch. 1 § 1, p.49-50.
The lien statute remained unchanged until 19 51 when the lien right was extended to any
person who "grades, fills in, levels, surfaces or otherwise improves any land." 1951 Sess. Laws, ch.
199, § 1, p. 422-23. The statute, codified as I. C. §45-501, was again modified in 1971 to provide lien
rights to professional engineers and land surveyors who render professional services under contract
for which they are legally authorized to perform. The revised statute reads as follows:
45-501. Right to lien.- Every person performing labor upon or furnishing materials
to be used in the construction, alteration, or repair of any mining claim, building,
wharf, bridge, ditch, dike, flume, tunnel, fence, machinery, railroad, wagon road,
aqueduct to create hydraulic power or any other structure, or who grades, fills in,
levels, surfaces or otherwise improves any land, or who performs labor in any mine
or mining claim, and every professional engineer or licensed surveyor under

contract who prepares or furnishes designs, plans, plats, maps, specifications,
drawings, surveys, estimates o(cost, on site observation or supervision, or who
renders any other professional service whatsoever [or which he is legally
authorized to perform in connection with any land or building development or
improvement, or to establish boundaries. has a lien upon the same for the work or
the labor done or professional services or materials furnished ....
1971 Sess. Laws, ch. 9,§1 p. 196-97 (emphasis added to new language within statute).
Concurrent with the 1971 amendment to I. C. §49-501, the Legislature amended I. C. §45-506
to incorporate professional services into lien preferences. The priority lien statute was amended to
read, in relevant part, as follows:
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45-506. Liens preferred claims. - The liens provided for in this chapter are
preferred to any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance, which may have attached
subsequent to the time when the building, improvement or structure was commenced,
work done, or materials or professional services were commenced to be furnished ...
Idaho Code 45-506; 1971 Sess. Laws, ch. 91, §4, p. 198.

B.

The District Court Incorrectly Interpreted Professional Service Liens to
Commence on the Date the First Services Are Performed On-Site.

The District Court erred in its interpretation of Idaho Code §45-506 by holding that the
priority date for liens arising from professional service contracts is the date in which actual physical
work was performed on the subject property. The error is self evident given that Idaho Code §45506 contains no language, whatsoever, that can be construed as restricting the priority date to work
being physically performed on the building or property at issue. The statute is void of any language
that differentiates the various types of professional services and, is void of any language which
suggests that the priority date is dependent upon the nature of the professional services rendered.
Instead, the statute, quite simply and unambiguously, states that for professional services, the priority
date is the date in which the "professional services were commenced to be furnished." I. C. §45-506.
The District Court's interpretation essentially rewrites the lien priority statute by interposing
restrictions for which the Legislature did not intend to include. As such, the District Court violated
the first rule of statutory construction which states that, "[t]he interpretation of a statute must begin
with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary
meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court
does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 54, 56,
294 P.3d 180, 182 (2013).

INTERVENOR-APPELLANT'S BRIEF

5

Idaho Code §45-506's statement that the mechanic's lien is "preferred to any lien, mortgage
or other encumbrance, which may have attached subsequent to the time when the ... professional
services were commenced to be furnished" is not ambiguous. Moreover, the plain, usual, and
ordinary meaning leaves only one rational interpretation which is that the priority date attaches to
the first date in which any professional services are furnished.
Not only does the District Court's interpretation run contrary to the plain, unambiguous
language of the priority statute but, also, it entirely ignores Idaho Code §45-501 and invalidates the
Legislature's intention of providing maximum lien protection to professional engineers. Further, the
District Court appears to have interpreted I.C. §45-506 in isolation, and without regard to, the
language ofl.C. §45-501. The two lien statutes were enacted as parts of the same act and must be
construed in pari materia. Boise Payette Lumber Co. v. Sharp, 45 Idaho 611, 264 P. 665, 666
(1928). Accordingly, the two statutes "should be construed harmoniously, if possible, so as to
further the legislative intent." Bonner County. v. Cunningham, 323 P .3d 1252, 1256 (Idaho Ct. App.
2014).
Reading the statues as a whole, there is no doubt that I.C. §45-506 does not restrict the
professional engineer's lien priority to the date professional services are provided on-site. Instead,
the priority date for professional services is clearly defined as the date when any professional
services are "commenced to be furnished." Had the Legislature intended to restrict the type of
professional services for lien priority purposes, as claimed by the District Court, it would simply
have added the restrictive language. The Legislature was well aware of its ability to define or limit
lienable activities to those occurring "on-site" as evidenced in I. C. §45-50 1 wherein the Legislature
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specifically limited lien rights for engineers' supervisory activities to those occurring "on-site" 1•
The Legislature's decision to not include any language within I.C. §45-501 that limits the priority
date for professional services to those performed "on-site" establishes that the Legislature did not
intend for the priority date to be so limited.
As stated above, Idaho Code §§ 45-501 and 45-506 are to be read together and "should be
construed harmoniously" to further the legislative intent. Bonner County, 323 P.3d at 1256. The
District Court's interpretation fails in this mandate and nullifies the legislative intent. When the
Legislature added professional engineering services to the lien statute, it treated engineers differently
than other laborers with lien rights. Unlike other persons performing labor, in listing the lienable
work available to engineers, the Legislature specifically included services that would occur off-site
and even prior to any improvements or construction occurring. All other lien holders' activities are
directly tied to the property or building at issue. Thus, the Legislature clearly intended to provide
professional engineers and land surveyors with the most expansive protection for their work. It
would be entirely inconsistent for the Legislature to grant such expansive lien rights to professional
engineers within LC. §45-501 by including preliminary design and off-site work only to then
effectively void that protection by watering down the value or usefulness of the lien right by
restricting the priority date to relate back only to physical work performed on-site. Clearly, no such
inconsistency was intended by the Legislature and to interpret the statue to include such an
inconsistency creates an absurdity.

1

I.C. §45-50 I states, in relevant part that "every professional engineer ... who prepares or furnishes designs,
plans, plats, maps, specifications, drawings, surveys, estimates of cost, on-site observation or supervision, or who
renders any other professional service whatsoever ... (Emphasis added.)
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C. Other Courts have Rejected the District Court's Interpretation of I. C. § 45-506.

Judge Kerrick's interpretation ofldaho Code §45-506 was rejected by U.S. District Court
Judge B. Lynn Winmill in his decision in Contractor's Equipment Supply Co., v. Prizm Group &

Construction, LLC, Case No. 1:10-CV-045-BLW, 2011 WL 6002462 (D. Idaho. Nov. 30, 2011).
In Prizm Group & Construction, an engineering firm entered into a written agreement to provide
professional engineering services for certain real properly located in Valley County, Idaho. The
engineering company began providing professional services on March 7, 2007. The lender recorded
a Deed ofTrust upon the property on July 2, 2007. There were no physical improvements that were
done to the property prior to the deed of trust being recorded. !d. The lender sought summary
judgment to declare that its deed of trust was superior to the mechanic's lien recorded by the
Engineer.
The lender sought an interpretation of I.C. §45-506 which gave it priority over any
mechanic's liens, including that of a professional engineer, unless the mechanic's lien holder
performed some visible work on the property before the lender recorded its deed oftrust. In support
of its position, the lender cited to Judge Kerrick's Order on Motions for Summary Judgment. The
U.S. District Court, however, rejected Judge Kerrick's requirement that professional services must
occur on-site before gaining priority.
Judge Winmill initially concluded that Judge Kerrick's reliance upon Walker v. Lytton

Savings, 465 P.2d 497 (Cal. 1970) was misplaced since the California priority statute at issue in
Walker was materially different than Idaho Code §45-506. Although similar in some respects, the
California statute addressed in Walker does not contain some important language found in I. C. §45506. While both statutes state that mechanic's liens are preferred to any mortgage which may have
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attached after the building improvement or structure commenced, the Idaho statute adds the
additional language that a mechanic's lien is also preferred over any mortgage which attached after
"materials or professional services were commenced to be furnished."
Ultimately, the U.S. District Court concluded that the priority date for the professional
service lien was based upon the first date in which the professional provided any services. In
reaching this conclusion, Judge Winmill was persuaded by the holding in Ultrawell, Inc. v.
Washington 1\1utual Bank, 135 Idaho 832, 25 P.3d 855 (Idaho 2001). The Court stated,
In that case, [Ultrawell], the Idaho Supreme Court stated that in order for a particular
claimant's lien to attach, the claimant must fit into one of three categories: ( 1) the
claimant must have commenced to furnish professional services such as engineering
or surveying; (2) the claimant must have commenced the physical construction of
building, improvement or structure; or (3) if the claimant was not involved with
either of the first two activities, it must have begun to work or furnish materials.
Ultrawall, 25 P.3d at 859. The first category applies in this case. Thus the question
before this Court is whether T -0 'commenced to furnish professional services' before
the deed of trust was filed.

Id. at *3.
To answer that question, the Court must first determine what is meant by
'commenced to furnish professional services.' It does not mean the commencement
ofthe physical construction of the building, improvement or structure. Otherwise, the
Idaho Supreme Court would not have created separate categories for these two events
in the Ultrawall decision. In fact, the Ultrawall decision would have been
meaningless unless the Idaho Supreme Court assumed there was a difference in the
two.

Id.
In rejecting an interpretation of I. C. §45-506 which required on-site work, Judge Winmill
again turned to Ultrawall for guidance, explaining that,
[T]he question in Ultrawall was whether the lien claim for a drywall contractor
attached when he commenced his work or whether it attached when another lien
holder provided the earliest known work on the project. The Idaho Supreme Court
accepted the fact that the earliest known work on the project was done by an engineer
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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who provided design services for the project before the deed of trust was filed.
Accordingly, this Court has no doubt that the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that
an engineer 'commenced to furnish professional services' when he began the design
services for the project before physical construction began.

!d.
Judge Winmill's conclusion that Idaho Code §45-506 does not require on-site work is well
supported by both the plain language of the statute as well as this Court's holding in Ultrawall. This
Court should adopt the U.S. District Court's interpretation as being correct.

D.

A Review of Other State's Lien Statutes Establishes That the Idaho Legislature
Would Have Included Restrictive Language Had it Intended to Limit the
Priority Date for Professional Services to On-Site Work.

In the case at bar, the District Judge's improper reliance upon Walker highlights the risk in
applying other state's interpretation of their lien statutes to ascertain the meaning of Idaho's lien
statute. The problem lies in the fact that the language of state lien statutes varies greatly. As noted
by Court in PDS Engineering & Construction, Inc. v. DoubleRS, CV 90 0378684S, 1991 WL
277359 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 1991 ), there is "a sharp conflict among the states on whether or
not preliminary plans and drawings of architects and engineers, before visible work is done on the
site, constitute commencement of services ... " !d. The Connecticut Court analyzed the issue and
found the disparity in the holdings to be explained by differences in the wording of the state
mechanic lien statues. !d. at *3. A review of state lien statutes confirms the lack of uniformity in
language. Despite the variations in drafting, a common thread among the states that require on-site
labor for priority purposes is that their respective statutes actually include restrictive language. A
sample of the limiting language used by other states include the following:
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Arkansas: "All such liens shall date from the time that the construction or repair first commenced.
Construction or repair commences when there is a visible manifestation ofactivity on real estate ..."
A.C.A. §18-44-10.

Arizona: "A notice and claim of lien for professional services shall not attach to the property for
priority purposes until labor has commenced on the property or until materials have commenced to
be furnished to the property so that it is apparent to any person inspecting the property that
construction, alteration or repair ofany building or the structure or improvement has commenced.
A.R.S. § 33-992.

Florida: "Any architect.. .engineer, or surveyor who ... shall perform services ... in connection with
a specific parcel of real property ... shall have a lien upon such real property ... regardless of whether
such real property is actually improved." F.S.A. §713.03. "Liens under 713.03 ... shall attach at the
time of recordation of the claim of lien and shall take priority as ofthat time." F.S.A. §713.07.

Hawaii: "Any person or association of persons furnishing labor or material in the improvement of
real property shall have a lien upon the improvement. .. " H.R.S §507-42. "The lien shall relate to and
take effect from the time of the visible commencement of operations for the improvements." H.R.S
§507-46.

Kansas: "The lien shall be preferred to all other liens or encumbrances which are subsequent to the
commencement of the furnishing of such labor, equipment, material or supplies at the site of the
property subject to the lien." K.S.A §60-1101.

Minnesota: "Engineering or land surveying services with respect to real estate or improvement of
real estate shall have a lien upon the improvement and upon land on which it is situated." 645.08(1)
As to mortgagee, no lien shall attach prior to the actual and visible beginning of the improvement
on the ground."

INTERVENOR-APPELLANT'S BRIEF

11

Nevada: The lien provided for in NRS § 108.221 to § 108.246, inclusive, are preferred to, "any lien,
mortgage or other encumbrance which may have attached to the property after the commencement
of construction of a work improvement." NRS § 108.225.

North Carolina: "A claim of lien on real property granted by this Article shall relate to and take
effect from the time ofthe first furnishing oflabor or materials at the site ofthe improvement by the
person the claiming the lien on real property." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 44A-1 0.

Oklahoma: "Such liens shall be preferred to all other liens or encumbrances which may attach to
or upon such land, buildings or improvements or either of them subsequent to the commencement
of such building." 42 Okl. St. § 141.

Oregon: "A lien ... upon any lot or parcel of land shall be preferred to any lien, mortgage or other
encumbrance which attached to the land after or was unrecorded at the time ofcommencement ofthe
improvement." Or. Rev. Stat. § 87.025.

Pennsylvania:

"The lien .. shall take effect and have priority ... as of the date of the visible

commencement upon the ground ofthe work of erecting or constructing the improvement. 49. P.S.
§ 1508.
Neither Idaho Code §45-501 nor §45-506 include any of the limiting language that is found
in the above statutes which restrict lien priority to on-site work. If the Idaho Legislature intended
for such limitations, it could have followed the lead of other states and included similar language to
make its intentions known. The lack of restrictive language evidences an intent not to include any
such limitation. As such, the District Court's decision which ties the priority date for professional
engineers to on-site work should be overturned.

E.

States with Lien Statutes That Are Similar to Idaho's Lien Statutes Have
Interpreted the Priority Date to Be the First Date in Which Any Professional
Services Are Provided.
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Idaho's lien laws pertaining to professional engineers are fairly unique in their language.
Excluding supervisory activities, the Legislature did not restrict the type of professional services used
to establish a priority date. Although differing somewhat in language, Colorado's lien statutes are
similar to Idaho's provisions in that they do not include language which restricts the types of services
that are considered in determining the lien priority. The Colorado statue which creates lien rights
provides that,
Every person who furnishes or supplies laborers, machinery .. .in the prosecution of
work ... or persons furnishing labor, laborers or materials to be used in construction,
alteration, improvement, addition to or repair, either in whole or in part, of any
building mill, bridge, ditch flume, aqueduct, reservoir, tunnel, fence, railroad, wagon,
road, tramway, or any other structure or improvement upon land, including adjacent
curb, gutter, and sidewalk and also architects, engineers, draftsmen and artisans who
have furnished designs, plans, plats, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of
costs, surveys, or superintendence or who have rendered other professional or skilled
service or bestowed labor in whole or in part .... shall have a lien upon the property
upon which they have furnished ...
Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 38-22-101(1)
Colorado's lien priority statute is similar to Idaho Code §45-506. It states,
All liens established by virtue of this article shall relate back to the time of the
commencement of work under the contract between the owner and the first
contractor ...
Colo. Rev. Stat. §38-22-106(1)
In Bankers Trust Co. v. El Paso Pre-Cast Co., 560 P.2d 457 (Colo. 1977), the Colorado
Supreme Court interpreted the phrase "commencement of work under the contract"when it addressed
the question of priority between the beneficiary of a deed oftrust and several mechanic's lien on the
same piece of property. In that case, there was a dispute between several lien claimants and a bank
which had made a loan to work on a project at an apartment complex. !d. at 459. The lien claimants
sought to have their lien relate back to the date an engineering firm and an architectural firm first
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT'S BRIEF

13

began work on the project. The Trial Court ruled that all mechanic's liens related to a time prior to
the date the deed of trust was filed. The bank appealed. !d. at 560 P.2d at 457. On appeal, the bank
asserted that the date establishing priority was the date work commenced upon the structure or
improvement. The bank argued that the term "work" meant "lienable work" and "commencement
of work" meant the start of actual on-site construction. !d., 560 P.2d at 460. Since the work of the
architect or engineer was done prior to the recording of the deed of trust and was not done on the
structure or improvement, the bank argued that it was not lienable work and on-site and actual
construction did not begin until after the bank's deed of trust was filed. ld. at 460.
The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed with the Bank's interpretation, noting that the phrase
"commencement of the work" was to be construed broadly in accord with the principal that
mechanic's lien laws should be construed in favor of the lien claimants. The Court also considered
the case of Park Lane v. Fisher, 5. P.2d 577, 579 (1931) which held that an architect's lien related
back to the commencement of his work upon the plans and drawings. !d. at 461. Ultimately, the
Colorado Supreme Court concluded that the architectural and engineering work performed
constituted "commencement of work" and, as such, found the date the work started to have been
before the record date ofthe deed oftrust. !d. at 461.
The State ofWashington's lien priority statute appears to be the most similar to Idaho Code
§ 45-506. It states, in relevant part,
Any person furnishing labor, professional services, materials, or equipment for the
improvement of real property [to] have a lien upon the improvement for the contract
price oflabor, professional services, material, or equipment furnished at the instance
of the owner.
R.C.W. 60.04.021.
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Claims of lien established under chapter 60.04 RCW "shall be prior to any lien, mortgage,
deed of trust, or other encumbrance which attached to the land after or was umecorded at the time
of commencement oflabor or professional services ... by lien claimant.
RCW §60.04.061.
The Washington lien provisions were interpreted by the Washington Court of Appeals in
Scott's Excavating Vancouver, LLC v. Winlock Properties, LLC, 308 P.3d 791 (Wash. App. 2013).
In Winlock Properties, an engineering firm entered into a contract with Winlock to perform
engineering services, including preliminary design work, assisting in obtaining government approval
for the project, and providing final design work. !d. at 795. The engineering company eventually
stopped work for nonpayment and recorded a lien. It then filed a foreclosure action. The key issue
at trial was the priority of the engineer's services. The Court ruled that the engineer's lien had
priority over the deed of trust. The bank appealed that conclusion. !d.
The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court's findings. In doing so, it
concluded that the engineer's lien for all its professional services related "back to the date if first
began work." Thus, the Court interpreted the phrase "commencement of professional services" to
mean the first date that the engineering services were provided.
Given the similarities between Colorado's, Washington's and Idaho's lien priority statutes,
the interpretations arrived at by the Courts in Winlock Properties and El Paso Pre-Cast should be
the same as the interpretation this Court should arrive at in the case at bar. Therefore, in the case at
bar, this Court should conclude that the lien priority date for Stanley Consultants, Inc. is the first date
in which it provided some professional engineering services.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, ACEC respectfully requests this Court reverse the District Court's
decision and hold that Stanley's lien priority relates back to the date it commenced to furnish
professional services.
DATED this__!}____ day of June, 2014.
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP

By:

_~_~=-----7""'---~~-_ ·-~~~~-
J<Jlatnan D. Hally, a membYofthe firm
Attorneys for Intervenor-Appellant
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